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中國證監會的救市歷史一轉帖•節錄

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發表於 2008-4-27 00:00:02 | 顯示全部樓層 |閱讀模式
1994年7月30日中國證監會宣布三項救帝措施:1.暫停新股發行及上市.2.嚴格控制上市公司配股規模.3.擴大入市資金範圍.出台後第一天股市指數上升33.2%,在33個交易天內由最低325點升上1052點,上升204.13%,其後又回落一年多,在1996年1月19日見512點,跌幅近半.
    第二次救市在1999牟5月19日,中國證監會召集全國證券商討論,其後推出改革股票發行體制,保險資金投入及解決證券公司合法融資渠道,6月10日央行更宣布減息,6月14日人民日報發表文章,堅定信心及規範發展,中國股市指數由5月19日起,在30個交易日內上升64%,到2001年6月14日最高點為2245.44,其後出現4年熊市.
    2002年6月23日中國政府第三次救市,宣布暫停國有股減持,引發6月24日井噴,但第二又回落,之後繼續漫長熊市,可以說這次救市最失敗.
    2004年2月2日是第四次救市行動,出現國務院關於推進資本市塲改革開放及穩定發展若干意見,簡指國九條,股市指數一直上升到4月7日,然後又再回落至2005年6月6日.
發表於 2008-4-27 00:20:49 | 顯示全部樓層
原帖由 華人 於 2008-4-27 12:00 AM 發表
1994年7月30日中國證監會宣布三項救帝措施:1.暫停新股發行及上市.2.嚴格控制上市公司配股規模.3.擴大入市資金範圍.出台後第一天股市指數上升33.2%,在33個交易天內由最低325點升上1052點,上升204.13%,其後又回落 ...


华兄,咁...今次救市又可以挨几耐呢...
發表於 2008-4-27 00:57:25 | 顯示全部樓層

回復 #1 華人 的帖子

時間剛好.......
發表於 2008-4-27 03:20:41 | 顯示全部樓層
原帖由 華人 於 2008-4-27 12:00 AM 發表
1994年7月30日中國證監會宣布三項救帝措施:1.暫停新股發行及上市.2.嚴格控制上市公司配股規模.3.擴大入市資金範圍.出台後第一天股市指數上升33.2%,在33個交易天內由最低325點升上1052點,上升204.13%,其後又回落 ...

thanks
 樓主| 發表於 2008-4-27 12:51:50 | 顯示全部樓層
原帖由 Touch 於 2008-4-27 12:20 AM 發表


华兄,咁...今次救市又可以挨几耐呢...

Touch兄,今次救市的目的,外界一般相信為奧運而來,如不能令股市回穩,或許還有其他措施出台.股市要見更低位,相信可能是奧運之後的事了.但外界一般認為,現時的救市措施刺激短暫,有幾間投資大行甚至建議趁A股反彈,逢高減持,亦同時指出內地分析員,對於今年A股盈利增長過於樂觀,兩者相差50%以上.小心點吧.
發表於 2008-4-27 13:45:32 | 顯示全部樓層

回復 #5 華人 的帖子

發表於 2008-4-27 13:53:28 | 顯示全部樓層
原帖由 華人 於 2008-4-27 12:51 PM 發表

Touch兄,今次救市的目的,外界一般相信為奧運而來,如不能令股市回穩,或許還有其他措施出台.股市要見更低位,相信可能是奧運之後的事了.但外界一般認為,現時的救市措施刺激短暫,有幾間投資大行甚至建議趁A股反彈 ...

多谢华兄...睇来要通知声K兄...逢高減持...
 樓主| 發表於 2008-4-27 15:34:21 | 顯示全部樓層
原帖由 Touch 於 2008-4-27 01:53 PM 發表

多谢华兄...睇来要通知声K兄...逢高減持...

A股佢熟識過我地.
發表於 2008-4-27 17:01:09 | 顯示全部樓層

回復 #1 華人 的帖子

thanks
發表於 2008-4-28 18:48:47 | 顯示全部樓層
原帖由 華人 於 2008-4-27 03:34 PM 發表

A股佢熟識過我地.


What Today's Drop in the China Market Could Mean
by: Michael Pettis posted on: April 25, 2008     

China's stock market is down today. This is exactly what I was worried about. After a strong start this morning on the back or yesterday’s furious rally, the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets suddenly turned negative and ended the day lower, with the SCI dropping by 0.71%.
It is widely known among financial market experts that governments can have powerful impacts on the market by signaling their intentions, but the more often they do it by pure signaling (i.e. with measures that have no fundamental impact), the less credible their signaling becomes over time. In other words, the more you intervene to control the market, the more empty your intervention becomes – this is a weapon whose greatest power lies in the rarity with which it is used.
I suspect we may be about to prove this yet again. For the past year we have seen a whole series of interventions designed explicitly to manage market prices – and although they have worked well, they have done so with decreasing success. The market surged 9.3% yesterday when the tax authorities announced that they were cutting the stamp tax, but everybody bought just because they expected everyone else to buy. There was no real conviction.
And since the announcement provided no real change in the earning prospects for Chinese companies, savvy investors seem to have taken advantage of the event to shift their shares into the hands of the more gullible. China Daily today quotes a man who trades stock at a Shanghai broker saying, in the midst of yesterday’s rally, “I bet the market would undergo a strong rebound before the Olympics, and I will exit the stock market forever if I can make any gains then. It is just too risky for ordinary people like me.” He is probably unhappier than ever today. If this kind of opinion is widespread, and I think it is, it bodes badly for the longer-term development of the stock markets.
How aware are the authorities of the risks of this kind of intervention? Th always astute Li Xinxin at Observatory Group wrote yesterday about the reasons for the stamp tax cut – a decision that he worries about no less than I do.
p>The new cabinet, especially Vice‐Premier Wang, once intended to reinstitute the non-intervention principle for China’s capital market, but their effort failed. In recent weeks, there was an intense debate among both policymakers and scholars about whether the government should rescue the stock market. Wang preferred not to use the trading tax rate to micromanage equity prices, but his opponents used the social stability argument as a major reason for such a decision. This is a critically strong argument in an Olympic year, and particularly when top leaders already are stretched by challenging issues such as Tibet and inflation.
The government has performed particularly poorly in public communications. Vice Premier Wang and his team had a good chance to establish new criteria for government intervention by expressing their views and guiding market expectations. But no government officials dared say anything on this issue, reflecting a very rigid political system. That silence gave the impression that the government made a major concession to market pressures in return for nothing.
With this tax rate cut, the government reversed an 11-month-old tax increase and reinforced the policy-driven feature of China’s stock markets. Certainly, the constant change of market rules does not help build a well-functioning market which could efficiently distribute financial resources in the long run. In this sense, the new cabinet is not different from its predecessor.
It will be interesting to see what happens to prices next week. My assistant Shang Ning TELls me that there are rumors that the big buyers who pushed prices up prior to the announcement of the cut in stamp tax were the local pension funds. I have no idea if this is true, but they do tend to have better access to information than the rest of us do, and clearly someone either very lucky or with very good information sources was buying the market if it traded up 4.2% after so many weeks of decline.
If many small investors really do expect a pre-Olympic rally that lets them out of their losing positions, I am afraid this is going to result in another disappointment. Still, maybe the government has a few more tricks up its sleeves. I think 3000 is widely considered to be the minimum level below which the government acts. Call it the “3000 put”?
In June 1999 I remember that Paul Krugman wrote a note on the implicit euro “put” that existed because for purely symbolic reasons European authorities were loathe to let the euro trade below $1 (how long ago that seems!). His conclusion, reached by an elegant application of option theory (you can find the note here), was that when the euro finally broke $1, it would break big. It did. Perhaps this has nothing to do with the Shanghai markets, but if the “3000 put” really does exist, it might have.
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